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INTRODUCTION
Edmund Runggaldier has always pursued the goal of reconstructing positions in the classic tradition 
of Christian philosophy within the framework of contemporary analytic philosophy. As a Jesuit he 
will certainly be delighted to see that one of the greatest contributions to philosophy by a fellow Je-
suit, Luis de Molina S.J. (1535–1600), finds so much interest in contemporary analytic philosophy. 
With Alvin Plantinga’s influential “The Nature of Necessity” (Plantinga 1974) and David Lewis’s 
possible-world analysis of counterfactuals (Lewis 1973) there were new conceptual tools available 
to tackle traditional problems in the philosophy of religion, like that of theodicy or that of reconcil-
ing the orthodox concept of God with that of libertarian human freedom. This latter  topic  had 
already been conceptualized within a  rather  similar  logical  apparatus  in the late  periods of the 
Schoolmen, the Baroque Scholastics, especially by Molina. It should come as no surprise that ana-
lytic philosophers took interest in the work of this great philosopher and theologian (cf. Flint 1998, 
122, fn. 1). 
The problem of Divine foreknowledge and human freedom bundles many great topics of 
analytic metaphysics into a focal point: causality and freedom, time and modality, and the semantics 
and ontology of counterfactuals. In this paper we will try to reconstruct Molina’s position within the 
contemporary analytic debate and specify to what extent Molina’s account of freedom can still be 
counted as a libertarian view: The Molinist claims to be a libertarian and nevertheless grants God 
full knowledge of future contingents with regard to human freedom. With disbelief many philosoph-
ers reply to this double-claim with “you can’t have it both ways” or “you can’t have the best of both 
worlds.” We try to show that the Molinist can actually “have it both ways.” There is a price to be 
paid, however: the notion of libertarian freedom has to be defined in a way that does not require an 
open future. In this paper we suggest such a notion based on the mathematical concept of a “choice-
function.”1
1. OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATE
The following system of propositions can serve as a prima facie representation of the logical struc-
ture of contemporary positions regarding the Divine attributes of omniscience and omnipotence and 
their relation to human freedom (cf. Rhoda 2007, 301-303). The following four propositions cannot 
collectively be true. Only certain selective combinations of these four propositions are logically co-
herent. The denial of at least one of the four propositions is required:
(1) God has the attributes of absolute independence, omniscience and omnipotence.
(2) There are future contingents, the future is causally open.
(3) It is impossible that the future be causally open and epistemically determined for someone.
(4) The future is epistemically open for God.
The Open Theist assumes (2), (3), and (4). Since (4), however, contradicts (1) it has to be denied by 
the Open Theist. Several theories try to temporalize God’s knowledge and thus God Himself (non-
* Incidentally, this common English proverb has its earliest recording in the time of Molina. The author is the English  
playwright John Heywood who was imprisoned for his Catholic beliefs and later fled England to avoid religious per-
secution. In a collection of proverbs, published by him in 1546, one finds:  “wolde you bothe eate your cake, and 
have your cake?”
1 We will have to assume a certain familiarity with this debate on the part of the reader. It is not possible to give a full  
theoretical explication of all the technical notions used in this paper.
eternalism).2 The denial of (4) is common to Theological Determinism, Analytic Thomism, and Ana-
lytic Molinism because they reject the notion of a non-omniscient God (Deus ignorans). However, a 
further distinction has to be made. Proposition (4) is a logical consequence of (2) and (3). Denial of 
(4) implies thus the denial of either (2) or (3). The theological determinist denies (2) while holding 
on to (3), thus claiming strict causal determination of the future. Thomism and Molinism can be 
subsumed under the negation of (3) while  still  asserting (2).  Thus,  they both believe that even 
though the future is not causally determined, God can still have foreknowledge of it. In Thomism 
this is explained by an eternalist concept of time in combination with a specific understanding of 
causality (cf. Craig 1988, 166-118): future contingents cannot be known as future events; rather, 
God contemplates them sub specie eternitatis as presently given to Him. He knows tenseless pro-
positions with definite temporal indexicals. For the Thomists3 this does not entail that God is in any 
way determined by temporal events, His aseity is uncompromised: all events, including free de-
cisions  and  actions,  are  pre-moved  (praemotio  physica)  and  pre-determined  (praedeterminatio  
physica) by the prime cause.4 This is also the medium (medium quo) by which God has knowledge 
of future contingents.
Molinism rejects  the Thomistic explanation which is based on eternalism and  praemotio  
physica. The latter, according to the Molinist, is a first step on a slippery slope towards determin-
ism. Molinism assumes only a rather general entitative concurrence of God, one that remains indif-
ferent  with  regard  to  free  acts  of  the  human  will  (concursus  simultaneus  et  indifferens):  “the 
‘primary cause’ of everything is God. Yet a human action is free only if the creaturely agent gives 
God’s ‘general concurrence’ that makes that action possible a particular direction by causally con-
tributing to it as well” (Jäger 2011, 89). In order to safeguard God’s sovereignty over his creatures, 
Molina postulates a Divine knowledge of certain counterfactuals: the theory of middle-knowledge. 
He distinguishes three specifications of Divine knowledge: first, the pre-volitional knowledge of all 
necessary truths and all possible worlds (scientia naturalis); second, the post-volitional knowledge 
of all contingent actual truths, including future ones, after creation (scientia libera); third, and in 
between the other two, the pre-volitional knowledge of all contingent truth-values of all counterfac-
tuals or pre-factual conditionals, especially those involving the counterfactuals of freedom (scientia  
media): “If creaturely essence P were instantiated in non-determining complete circumstances C at 
time t, the instantiation of P would (freely) do A” (Flint 1998, 47). (To formalize this, we will be us-
ing the notation of David Lewis: “C □→ A.” “□→” denotes the “would”-implication: “If it were the 
case that C, then it would be the case that A”. This has to be distinguished from the “might”-implic-
ation “C ◊→ A”: “If it were the case that C, it might be the case that A,” cf. Lewis 1973, 2.) Neither 
the counterfactuals of freedom nor the Divine act of creation cause (by efficient causation) free hu-
man actions. God’s sovereignty is established by the fact that He has access to this middle know-
ledge logically prior to His free choice in the act of creation. God can freely create circumstances 
(or worlds) and place free creatures in them in such a way that they freely choose under those cir -
cumstances those free actions that fulfill the Divine creative plan.
The scheme of the four propositions enabled us to systematize the positions on God’s omni-
science and the openness of the future. When it comes to the problem of freedom and determinism 
regarding human actions, another way of systematization is helpful. It is a scheme of three proposi-
tions forming a logical trilemma. Any two of the three propositions are logically consistent, but the 
third has to be denied (cf. Flint 1998, 22-23; Brüntrup 2000, 102-10):
2 A weaker version of Open Theism could replace (3) by this assumption: It is impossible that the future be open and  
all propositions about the future have definite truth values. The future would be unknown to God because the truth-
values of propositions concerning the future have not yet been determined. Since knowledge implies truth, God 
knows all knowable propositions and is thus omniscient (cf. Rhoda 2007, 303-304). This position runs into a conflict 
with the Law of Conditional Excluded Middle.
3 We refer here to the historically influential Bánnezian brand of Thomism (Domingo Bánnez, 1528-1604).
4 Can the free human will resist the pre-determined praemotio by God? The Thomists have a rather complex answer 
to this question which we cannot address here. In a nutshell: God causes these free actions contingently and as con-
tingent events. God predetermines the free will in its free nature. In sensu diviso there is even in a pre-moved will 
the potentiality to resist, at least counterfactually. In sensu composito, however, the finite will is unable to make an-
other choice (cf. Thomas Aquinas, De Ver, q. 6, a. 4, ad 8; q. 23, a. 5, ad 3).
(a) Some human actions are free.
(b) All humans actions are determined by circumstances and events which are outside of the 
agent and not under the agent’s control (remote past and laws of nature, Divine foreknowledge 
and predestination).
(c) It  is  impossible that a free action be determined by circumstances and events which are 
outside of the agent and not under the agent’s control.
Theological Determinism denies propositions (a) and affirms (b) and (c). This is the claim that there 
are no free human actions. Open Theism denies proposition (b) and asserts (a) and (c); it is clearly a 
libertarian  position. Bánnezian  Thomism  denies  (c)  and  affirms  (a)  and  (b)  with  respect  to 
determination by God.  It  can thus  be classified as  compatibilism.  In the literature Molinism is 
commonly labeled as a libertarian position (cf. Flint 1998, 24-34). This implies the denial of (b) and 
the affirmation of (a) and (c). However, classifying Molinism as a libertarian position gives rise to  
some controversial claims which will be systematically addressed in what follows.
2. THE ANTI-MOLINIST CONSEQUENCE ARGUMENT
It is our contention that if Molinism is to be a libertarian position, the Molinist had better consider 
the  Consequence  Argument  against  compatibilism  a  valid  argument.  The  conclusion  of  the 
Consequence Argument is that nobody has a free choice about anything, assuming that we live in a 
deterministic world,  and the past and the laws of nature cannot be changed. We will  label this 
argument “CAComp” (cf. Van Inwagen 1983, 96-98, 147). The problem of Divine foreknowledge and 
human  freedom  is  logically  analogous  to  the  problem  of  freedom  and  determinism.  It  is  of 
considerable signifiance in this  context  that some arguments against  Molinism have the logical 
structure of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. In that case the Molinist might be 
forced  to  use  similar  strategies  to  those  put  forth  by the  compatibilists  who argue  against  the 
Consequence Argument. 
Let us call such an argument against Molinism “CAMol” (cf. Perszyk 2003). Let C be a set of 
circumstances and A be an action, then let “C □→ A” be any true counterfactual of freedom known 
by Divine middle-knowledge. We also define a “Choice-operator”: 
Chxp :=  “p  obtains and it was in  x’s power to take an action A such that A occurs and  
therefore p is true” (cf. Rugel 2006, 41-44). 
We define the “No-Choice-Operator” in the standard way: 
Np := p  (∧ ∀x: ¬Chx¬p)
For any free action the following principle holds: 
(F)  A is free :⇔ ∃x: ChxA ↔ ¬NA
We also assume the rules α and β, well-established in the literature: 
(α) □p → Np
(β) Np, N(p → q) ├ Nq
We can then argue against Molinism in a way strictly parallel to the classical Consequence Argu-
ment (cf. Perszyk 2003, 148):
(CAMol,1) 1) □{[(C □→ A) ∧ C] → A} Consequence of Molinism
2) □[(C □→ A) → (C → A)] from 1)
3) N[(C □→ A) → (C → A)] 2), α-rule
4) N(C □→ A) Fixity of middle knowledge
5) N(C → A) 3), 4), β-rule
6) NC Axiom
7) NA 5), 6), β-rule
But since principle (F) holds for any free action, CAMol,1 implies the incompatibility of Molinism 
and libertarian freedom. Due to difficulties with the original Van Inwagenian Consequence Argu-
ment, especially with the β-rule, many improved versions have been advanced in the literature. For 
reason of simplicity, elegance and the relative lack of problem cases, we thus suggest the following 
definitions (cf. Brüntrup 2000, 112; Rugel 2006, 56):
N*p :=   p  (∧ ∀x: ¬Chx(◊¬p)) 
(β*)  N*p, □(p → q) ├ N*q
 
The Anti-Molinist Consequence Argument can now be rephrased:
(CAMol,1*)              1) N*[(C □→ A)  C]∧ Fixity of middle knowledge and antecedents
2) □{[(C □→ A)  C] ∧ → A} Consequence of Molinism
3) N*A 1), 2), β*
In  his  “Molina  on  Foreknowledge  and Transfer  of  Necessities” (2011),  Christoph  Jäger 
draws on an informal version of this argument. As a stronger and more coherent replacement for 
Molina’s notion of “accidental  necessity”  (of propositions  known by middle knowledge),  Jäger 
introduces the notion of “causal-impact necessity” or “CI-necessity” (cf. Jäger 2011, 84-88):5
(CI-necessity) A metaphysically contingent proposition or state of affairs p is CI-necessary 
for a given agent at t iff it is not within the agent’s power at t to contribute causally to some
thing that constitutes, or grounds, a necessary or sufficient condition for p. (Jäger 2011, 88).
The principle (F) can thus be read as:
(F’) For libertarian freedom with respect to an action A, it is necessary that A is not CI-
necessary for the agent. 
The transfer principle given by Jäger is accordingly:
(β’) “If it is CI-necessary for a given subject at t that p, and p [strictly6] entails q, then it is 
CI-necessary for that subject at t that q” (Jäger 2011, 92). 
Jäger’s overall argument now runs like this (slightly modified by us, cf. Jäger 2011, 91)
(CAMol,2)
1. At any time in S’s life it is CI-necessary for S that God knows (prevolitionally and from ex-
tra-temporal eternity) via middle knowledge that S, when placed in circumstances C at  t, 
would freely do A.
2. God’s knowing (prevolitionally and from extra-temporal eternity) via middle knowledge that 
S, when placed in circumstances C at t, would freely do A, entails [strictly] that S, if placed 
in C at t, freely does A.
3. Hence, it is CI-necessary for S that, when placed in C at t, S freely does A.
4. S is not free in doing A freely when placed in C at t.
The inference from (2) to (3) is based on the  β’-rule, and the inference from (3) to (4) is 
based on the definition of libertarian freedom given in (F’) above. The CI-necessity of a proposition 
5 “A proposition p is accidentally necessary at t iff p is (i) metaphysically contingent and (ii) true at t and every mo-
ment after t in every possible world that has the same history as our world at t” (Jäger 2011, 86), or, as defined by 
William of Sherwood:  “That is accidentally necessary which neither now or in the future can be false, but once  
might have been false” (Sherwood, Introductiones, 11, 34).
6 That is, by metaphysical necessity (there is no possible world, such that God knows a counterfactual of freedom in  
it, and the appropriate event does not occur if the the relevant circumstances have been actualized). This clarifying  
and relevant addition can be found in Jäger 2010, 313.
p implies, that the subject has no choice such that possibly ¬p (i.e. ¬Chx(◊¬p)). Thus, the β’-rule 
operating in  CAMol,2  is as strong as β* in  CAMol,1*. 
These inferences can, just as the classical replies of the compatibilists to  CAComp, be under-
mined by a refutation of the relevant β-rules. This is the route taken by Jäger, following an earlier 
argument by Freddoso (cf. Jäger 2011, 92-96; Freddoso 1988, 53-62). The appropriateness of this 
move seems to be vindicated by the fact that Molina himself seemingly rejects modal transfer prin-
ciples in Concordia 4.52.34: 
“For in such a case, even if (i) the conditional is necessary (because in the composed sense these  
two things cannot both obtain, namely, that God foreknows something to be future and that the 
thing does not turn out that way), and even if (ii) the antecedent is necessary in the sense in  
question (because it is past-tense and because no shadow of alteration can befall God), nonethe-
less the consequent can be purely contingent” (transl. Freddoso, Molina 1988, 189).7
A correct analysis of this passage is, however, more difficult than one might initially think. It 
is by no means clear whether Molina wants to reject a transfer principle of the form (Np, □(p → q) 
├ Nq), or whether he rather intends to reject an inference of the form (Np, □(p → q) ├ □q) with re-
spect to metaphysical necessity in the consequent. And also, in the same paragraph 34 Molina ar-
gues against this inference by counterfactual situations: “For if, as is possible, the opposite of the 
consequent were going to obtain, then the antecedent would never have obtained beforehand [...].” 
It is, however, not the topic of this paper to settle these exegetical questions.
Jäger argues that Molina not only rejects the transfer principle as a matter of fact, he is also 
committed to this rejection to avoid inconsistencies. Jäger tries then to refute the transfer principle 
by making use of Ravizza’s overdetermination objection (cf. Ravizza 1994). A fact H is assumed to 
be caused by two independent events E1 and E2. Each of the two events is by itself sufficient for the 
truth of H. Now let E1 be a free choice of an agent S. With regard to the moral responsibility of S for 
the occurrence of H, the following inference is possible: (i) S is not responsible that E2; (ii) S is not 
responsible that (E2 → H); (iii) Thus: S is not responsible that H. However, (iii) is false. Since the 
inference from (i) and (ii) to (iii) relies on a  β-transfer principle, and both premises are true, the 
transfer principle must be false. Transfer principles can be defended against this line of argument. 
Jäger himself offers an improved transfer principle for the case of moral responsibility which is im-
mune to overdetermination objections  (Jäger  2006, 14-19).  The more general  problem of these 
counterexamples to β-principles, regardless of whether they are directed against moral responsibil-
ity or the no-choice operator, is this: If H follows deterministically and S is responsible for H, then 
compatibilism is already assumed. Assuming compatibilism in a refutation of a version of the Con-
sequence argument, an argument that is meant to defeat compatibilism, is obviously a petitio prin-
cipii. If, however, H follows indeterministically, then this assumption of indeterminism in a line of 
reasoning that is – against a version of the Consequence Argument – ultimately meant to prove the 
compatibility of freedom and determinism is pointless (cf. Brüntrup 2000, 109).
3. COUNTERFACTUAL POWER OVER MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE
A much more important problem in the general rejection of the β-rule seems to be that the Molinist 
would have to reject not only CAMol,2 or CAMol,1 but also CAComp along with it since in all those ar-
guments the same structure of β-rules is at work (the objection made by Jäger stems from the debate 
about CAComp) – which is not admissible for the Molinist (as a libertarian), because the assumption 
of the validity of CAComp is a necessary (if not sufficient) condition for being a libertarian. If the 
Molinist, along with Jäger, rejects the  β-rule’s validity it becomes difficult for him to maintain a 
libertarian position. 
7 “Tunc enim, esto condicionalis sit necessaria, quia in sensu composito cohaerere non possunt ista duo, quod Deus 
aliquid praesciat futurum et illud non eo modo eveniat, et esto antecedens illo modo sit necessarium, quia praeter -
itum et quia in Deum nulla possit cadere vicissitudinis obumbratio, nihilominus consequens potest esse mere contin-
gens.”
So another way taken in the literature to refute the anti-Molinist Consequence-Argument 
consists not in the rejection of the β-rule but in the repudiation of the premises, that is to deny the 
statement that we have no choice at all regarding the truth values of the counterfactuals of freedom 
concerning us. Even if we are unable to exert any causal power on the knowledge of God and its 
contents  (for  this  would  deny the  independence  of  God),  we could  still  possess  counterfactual 
“power” over it, since the scientia media’s counterfactual conditionals for their part have no causal  
influence on our actions and are only contingently true. Rather, they are explanatorily prior to our 
actions but logically and causally insufficient for them (cf. Morriston 2001; Perszyk 2003, 141): 
lacking causal power over a truth  p is not the same as lacking counterfactual power over  p. The 
Molinist has the option to allow this counterfactual power only over the counterfactuals of freedom: 
in CAComp he does not have to allow counterfactual power regarding the remote past P and the laws 
of nature L as compatibilists do, for the past and laws, contrary to the counterfactuals of freedom, 
are not subject-related. Indeed, Van Inwagen models his definition of determinism □[(P ∧ L) → Fu-
ture] explicitly in such a way that P is a state of the past before the existence of free subjects (cf. 
Schneider 2009, 23). This counterfactual power over counterfactual conditionals and, along with it, 
over the scientia media is explicitly conceded by Molina himself; he writes on middle knowledge: 
“[it] would be different in God if, as is possible, created free choice were by its innate freedom go-
ing to turn itself to the opposite part [...] ([...] aliter se haberet in Deo, si liberum arbitrium creatum 
pro sua innata libertate, ut potest, in oppositam partem foret inflectendum [...])” (Concordia 4.52.31, 
cf. 4.52.30, 32 and 34).8
This can be specified further (cf. Perszyk 2003, 140f.): if M0 is the state of God’s middle 
knowledge which contains the counterfactual C □→ A, and is counterfactually dependent on a de-
cision on our behalf, then this means that the counterfactual power for the backtracking counterfac-
tual ¬A□→ ¬M0 is true. But that also means that – if M0 holds – it is not possible for an agent to 
actually choose ¬A (within the “physical state” of being created, the scientia media is virtually un-
avoidable for it precedes our temporal existence, cf.  Ramelow 1997, 263) since this would entail 
the impossibility of counterfactual power over the counterfactual conditional, as can clearly be seen 
in the logic for counterfactuals by David Lewis: 
(¬A ∧ M0) → (¬A ◊→ M0) ↔ ¬(¬A □→ ¬M0)
Within the logic of counterfactuals it is impossible for us to have counterfactual power over the sci-
entia media (i. e. that the appropriate back-tracker be true) and still, assuming M0 holds, to be able 
to act differently in the actual course of the world. The Molinist is therefore unable to claim both. 
To put it differently: if we have counterfactual power over the knowledge of God it is, under actual-
ized circumstances C,  logically if not  actually possible to act in a different manner from the one 
which is contained “beforehand” in God’s middle knowledge. Our  actual actions are accidentally 
but not metaphysically necessary. There are possible worlds containing actions that originated from 
free choices and the scientia naturalis contains (among other things) all possible worlds in which an 
individual P decides differently under the same circumstances C (reasons, dispositions etc.) than in 
the (assumedly) true counterfactual C □→ A, namely in choosing ¬A. Therefore it is  logically or 
metaphysically possible that there should be different courses of the world than those provided ac-
tually and contingently by the middle knowledge. 
4. THE INDIVIDUAL ESSENCE AS “NOTIO COMPLETA”
4.1 Libertarianism without open future
8 Cf. also Concordia, 4.52.10: “For if created free choice were going to do the opposite, as indeed it can, then God 
would have known that very thing through this same type of knowledge, and not, what He in fact knows [Si namque 
liberum arbitrium creaturam acturum esset oppositum, ut revera potest, idipsum scivisset per eandem scientiam, non  
autem quod reipsa scit].”
Now, does this mean that the Molinistic approach will slide into a form of compatibilism? For com-
patibilism also chooses a way out of CAComp using counterfactual power, counterfactual power over 
the laws of nature and the past in this case. But the crucial difference between a compatibilist and 
Molinist is that for the Molinist neither the past nor the laws of nature nor Divine knowledge influ-
ence the free choice causally in any way. For the Molinist the rational agent is the cause of his de-
cisions completely within himself – he is an independent cause in the sense of agent causation. The 
Molinist therefore has to maintain CAComp along with the libertarian and at the same time has to re-
ject CAMol. This means especially that the Molinist has to assume the β-rule to be valid and to set 
the crucial difference in the possibility of counterfactual power: while counterfactual power over 
the past and the laws of nature has to be rejected it has to be assumed regarding Divine knowledge, 
which is of a completely different nature from the past and the laws of nature.9 
Nevertheless there is a crucial difference between Molinism and the classical libertarian pos-
ition: a possible world’s future regarding free actions may be causally open within the scientia me-
dia (sentence (2) of the initially introduced system of sentences) but still the future does not consti-
tute a “garden of forking paths” (Kane 2005, 7) in a (possible or actual) creation presented by the 
scientia media and the scientia libera: The courses of action are decisively predefined. If God were 
to rewind time by some units to a point before the actual choice and would let it proceed again, the 
resulting decision would always be the same. So, if we analyse freedom in a libertarian sense we 
can discern two crucial aspects of freedom for the classical libertarian (cf. Morriston 2001, 30-31) 
of which the Molinist can accept only one: 
(I) Agent causation and autonomy: Nothing (else) caused the agent to act as he did.
(II) Principle of alternate possibilities: Exactly as things were at the time of action, the agent 
could have refrained from doing the act.
Molinism embraces Principle (I) as a crucial element of freedom against determinism (and the tri-
lemma of freedom initially does not require more for a libertarian position). Principle (II), formu-
lated as (F) or (F’) above, does not hold for the Molinist in the actual world. We are facing a liber-
tarianism without an open future. This means that the definiteness of the course of decision is not 
synonymous with lawlike determination: The decisions originate in the individual himself and are 
not  heteronomous  but  still  follow  an  unambiguous  path  through  time.  Using  “Frankfurt-style 
counterexamples,” Bergmann (2002) argues that the “Principle of alternate possibilities” is not ne-
cessary to ascribe created beings responsibility for their actions.10
4.2 Intentional pre-existence and “notio completa”
But how is this possible? Without venturing into the exegesis of the concept of freedom in Molina’s 
Concordia on the point of its concept of freedom, it still is possible to trace a historical line of 
Molinist concept formation which renders some insight into our systematical question:
For Molina within the counterfactual C □→ A there is no deterministic connection between 
C and A. From Molina’s point of view, the only connection between them is formed by the super-
comprehension  of God (cf. Concordia 4.49.11, 4.52.33): the indeterminateness of the freedom of 
choice is balanced by the superdeterminateness of Divine knowledge which infinitely transcends its 
object of knowing, and therefore “supercomprehends” it. The infinite power of representation of the 
Divine essence, by which God knows everything without requiring external information, and the in-
finite depth of His knowledge replace, as it were, the lacking determinateness of the human will (cf. 
Ramelow 1997, 56; Craig 1988, 178f.).11 From this concept of supercomprehensive knowledge we 
can draw a line to the Leibnizian term conceptus completus, or the individual idea of a free agent. 
9 Perzyk 2003 extensively discusses the problems of this distinction, but we cannot explore these in this paper. If  
Molinism is supposed to be a libertarian position, then it is inevitably is bound to this distinction.
10 Frankfurt-cases have been invoked explicitly against the tansfer-principles. As counterexamples they are only valid 
against β though, not against β* (cf. Brüntrup 2000, 110-111).
11 For the Molinist, this means a receptive, not a creative form of knowledge on this point.
This connection can be traced best by quoting the Molinist Hieronymus Fasolus S.J. (1568-1639) 
(cf. Ramelow 1997, 228): 
“According to Molina […] the free cause [...]  cannot be known in a perfect manner, unless 
everything that is contained in this cause is also known, as well as everything what can possibly 
be caused by it, what has been caused by it, will be caused by it, and would be caused by it; for 
the effects too, and indeed all these effects, are something of this cause. So he who perfectly 
knows the cause, necessarily also knows these effects that depend on it in any respect whatso-
ever […]. But it is evident that this perfect knowledge must be infinite regarding future effects.” 
(In primum partem Summae D. Thomae Commentariorum, T.2, Lyon 1629, 269a, cf. Knebel  
1991, 3).12
Even if he rejects the concept of a middle knowledge in God, Leibniz has a very similar intuition re-
garding the Divine foreknowledge: 
“God preserves our being and continually generates it, namely in such a way that we encounter  
thoughts spontaneously or freely in that order which is carried by the concept of our individual  
substance and in which it  could be forseen from all  eternity” (Discours de métaphysique, § 
30).13
Without having to follow Leibniz in his particular theory of individual ideas we can use the quota-
tions by him and Fasolus as a backdrop for forming the following model: The individual essence14 
of a free actor P pre-exists intentionally in the Divine mind logically prior to God’s act of creation. 
For a formal exposition, let U be the set of possible conditions C, C∈U, and let A be a set of pos-
sible actions to be taken and M a set of subsets of A, {Ai : i ∈ I} ∈ M. Then, by His scientia natural-
is, God knows which sets of actions are coherent with which conditions, formulated as a function 
from U to M:
FP: U → M,
FP(C) = {Ai : i ∈ I}
The actor P to be created should be free, therefore several choices among actions coherent with re-
spect to conditions U are available for him. Formally, he can avail himself of several choice-func-
tions
ch: M → A.
These choice-functions have sets  as arguments and one element of the respective arguments as 
value: ch({Ai :  i  ∈ I}) = AC, where AC ∈ {Ai :  i  ∈ I}. The actor to be created has a set of choice-
functions CH at his disposal: in the strict logical sense there are several free choices consistent with 
the single circumstances and the actors individual essence. This also may be regarded as belonging 
to God’s scientia naturalis.
By His scientia media, God knows which specific choice-function the actor to be created is 
going to select. So God knows not only the family of choice-functions CH available to the actor to 
be created but also which one the actor would select, He knows:
ch* ∈ CH, 
ch*: M → A, 
ch*(Ai : i ∈ I) = AC*.
12 “Mente Molinae [...] causa libera [...] non potest perfectissimo modo obiective cognosci, nisi simul cognoscantur et 
omnia, quae sunt in causa, et praeterea omnia quae ex causa vel esse possunt, vel erunt, vel sunt, vel fuerunt, vel es-
sent; nam effectus etiam, atque adeo omnes isti effectus, sunt aliquid causae; ergo qui cognoscit perfectissimo modo 
causam, eius etiam effectus, quavis ratione ab ea pendentes, cognoscat necesse est [...]. Quod autem haec perfectis-
sima cognitio respectu effectuum futurorum esse debeat infinita, patet.”
13 For a precise reconstruction of the development of the Leibnizian concept of the individual idea or the “notio com-
pleta” within the Molinist debate from the perspective of the age cf. Ramelow 1997, 401-419.
14 Cf. Kvanvig 1986, 122-126.
In sum, by His middle knowledge, God knows the composed function 
SP* := ch*○FP : U → A, 
the first component being the choice of the actor to be created, and the second simply indicating 
which actions are coherent with which conditions (within a coherence framework – a possible world 
– W0. A world in which ch*○FP holds can thereby become actual, i.e. it is a “feasible” world, cf. 
Flint 1998, 51-54). All these functions, i.e. the conditional connections between C and the  Ai, are 
pre-volitional for God. Not until God creates one (and for each point in time only one) C*∈U does 
He have any scientia libera. The scientia libera arises in evaluating the composed function ch*○FP 
at the created condition (the argument C*), ch*[FP(C*)]. 
So the free choices originate  from the individual’s essence instead of receptively being the 
consequence of external causes. The composed functions SP* = ch*○FP present a “Logic of Free-
dom” inherent in possible beings. Their decisions intentionally anticipated by the Divine mind in 
the guise of the abstract and therefore trans-temporal essential functions  SP*  are the medium of 
knowledge (medium quo) by which God contemplates15 the counterfactuals of freedom from His 
eternal point of view. These functions also provide the truth-makers for counterfactuals demanded 
by the  famous  Grounding  Objection  against  Molinism (cf.  Flint  1998,  123-126;  Hasker  1989; 
Adams 1977, 30). Since the functions are pre-volitional, the scientia media is not caused by an act 
of the Divine will, and since they are pre-existent, the actual decisions within the actual creation are 
also not the cause for the truth values of the counterfactuals (which would mean the aporetical ex-
ternal determination of the actus purus).
4.3 Man as the image of God
So creatures in actual reality cannot claim freedom of choice. Therefore, Molinism is able to radic-
ally construct man as the image of God, for in classical scholasticism God also does not have “al-
ternative courses of action” within Himself in the strict sense: He does not change and is still free, 
even the source of all freedom. For Thomas Aquinas, God does not have freedom of choice regard-
ing Himself since he recognises Himself as the absolute good and complete perfection, and there-
fore necessarily affirms Himself. He only has freedom of choice “ad extra” – what makes the Di-
vine freedom of choice a relation of the perfect being toward imperfect beings, so it cannot be re-
garded as part of the actual, original freedom of God. Freedom of choice according to Aquinas can 
thus only be attributed to God in a secondary sense (cf. Schöndorf 2006, 654-655). For the classical 
Molinist too, God does not have freedom of choice in the actual meaning: the only freedom of 
choice that could occur within God Himself would be a freedom of the Divine hypostases toward 
each other by which they freely choose each other (cf. Schöndorf 2006, 658). But for the Molinist 
Luis Perez, for example, this is explicitly impossible since the Divine persons are logically prior 
than the choices of God. To prove his point, Perez explicitly refers to Molina himself (cf. Ramelow 
1997, 252).
The classical position also does not attribute freedom of choice to the angels and saints in 
heaven since they are facing the infinite good which is God and necessarily affirm it as their ulti-
mate goal.16 True freedom is seen as the striving for the highest good, as well as its affirmation.17 
The freedom of beings within the world also has its core in this affirmation of the good. But in a 
fallen world they are possessed by a receptiveness for the deviation from perfection resulting from 
original sin. Their morally wrong actions in the sinful maze of circumstances within this world are 
also contained within the functions of their essences as possibilities.
15 Speaking of distinct, finite functions within the Divine mind can of course only be understood modo nostro concip-
iendi. The Divine mind is not discursive but rather contemplates his “objects” of knowing.
16 Tradition explains the fall of the angels by an initially obscured perception of the absolute perfection on their behalf  
which enabled them to sin by deprivation.
17 The rejection of the good in this case is synonymous with the loss of freedom, comparable to a drug addict losing his 
freedom by abandoning himself to the mechanism of evil - he becomes a “slave of sin.”
Within the actual world freedom at its core thus consists in an independent self-realisation of 
the creature in an internal coherence with itself as well as in a comprehension of the inner logic of  
its being: “become what thou art.” We encounter freedom if the created being acts of its own accord 
in such a way that is coherent with itself. The created being independently and uncoercedly strives 
for realising its very own, complete form.18
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have seen that the Molinist has to accept the consequence-argument CAComp against compatibil-
ism regarding the determinateness of nature, if he wants to remain a libertarian, while he has to re-
ject the consequence-arguments CAMol against the “compatibility” of Gods foreknowledge and hu-
man freedom. But then he is unable to reject the validity of the principles of transfer that are at work 
in both consequence-arguments. The Molinist has to assume a counterfactual power over the (sub-
ject-related) contents of the middle knowledge, while rejecting such a counterfactual influence on 
the past and the laws of nature. Thus in the actual state of being created, it is only logically and not  
actually possible to act differently from what is known by the middle knowledge. So the Molinist,  
as we have seen, has to advocate a libertarianism without open future regarding the actual world: 
Libertarian freedom is conceived of in a weaker sense, as agent causation with an  unambiguous 
course of action through time. However, this unambiguity is not synonymous with lawlike determ-
ination. The possibility of this is modeled best by an intuition shared by Molinists from the time 
between Molina and Leibniz: within the Divine mind (and only within His mind) there pre-exists an 
individual idea of a free creature P which contains all of its possible actions, as well as true counter- 
or prefactual conditionals in the form of the function  SP*. The truth values of these conditionals 
cannot be ascribed with metaphysical necessity. This function is the counterfactuals’ truth-maker 
before the act of creation, thereby refuting the notorious grounding objection against Molinism. 
But this raises the question of a much deeper grounding-objection which does not relate to 
the question of truth-makers: Where do the functions SP* originate? Are they created by God? Then 
the scientia media is not pre-volitional. Or is it something that confronts God in a relative form of  
autonomy from all eternity as the  Possibilia in the thought of Suárez do (cf. Mahieu 1921, 229-
232)? But then, who defines that they are exactly as they are? Are they brute facts? William Lane 
Craig suggests that a further grounding of the truth values of the counterfactuals of freedom would 
make freedom impossible (cf. Craig 2001; Davidson 2004, 368), and the same goes for the essential  
functions SP*; they would simply form the fundamental, irreducibly basic elements in the architec-
tonics of Molinistic theory that are founded in the supercomprehension of God, in the infinite depth 
of His knowledge.
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